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1. Tort claims against Paul and Gravel Plus
a) Paul and Gravel Plus may be sued jointly and severally for negligence. Paul may be sued for his negligent failure to properly secure the large load of gravel. Gravel Plus may be sued under a theory of respondeat superior due to Paul’s negligence.
An employer will be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employee action within the scope of his employment. Paul, the driver of the Gravel Plus truck, is presumably a Gravel Plus employee. If Paul is not a Gravel Plus employee, or is merely an independent contractor, then Gravel Plus may not be subject to vicarious liability. An independent contractor typically gets paid by the job (rather than salary), is under his own control (not that of his employer), and works regular hours dictated by employer (rather than hours of his choice). Here, although the facts are not clear, it appears that Paul is acting as an employee. He is working normal hours and he calls his boss immediately after the accident. We do not know his pay schedule. It should be noted that Gravel Plus may cross claim against Paul for indemnity.
Diane may bring a claim in negligence and so too may Paul, through his representative. Georgia has a survival statute, which allows tort claims to survive the death of the victim and be brought by the decedents representative.
To prevail in claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show that defendant owed her (I) a duty; (ii) that defendant breached that duty; (iii) that the defendant’s actions were the actual and proximate causes of plaintiff’s injury; and (iv) damages. Here, Paul had a duty of care, to act in a similar manner as a reasonable truck driver carrying gravel would. A reasonable truck driver would properly secure a large load of gravel because it is foreseeable that unsecured gravel could cause injury. Paul will be in breach of this duty by not properly securing the gravel.
Plaintiffs will not have to prove duty and breach if they can prove negligence per se via violation of statute. Paul may also be in violation of local, city or state ordinances requiring objects being carried by commercial vehicles to be properly secured. If so, Paul will be negligent per se, and duty and breach will be satisfied so long as plaintiff can show that she is among the class of people to be protected (other motorists to be protected from flying objects improperly secured) and the class of harm to be protected (injury to other motorists is improperly secured items become unsecured).
Causation must also be proven. Actual causation, or but for causation, exists where “but for” the defendant’s negligent acts, there would have been no injury. Here, plaintiff would show that, but for Paul’s negligence, Jack would not have gone into shock, Diane would not have been knocked unconscious, and Jack would not have bled to death.
Proximate cause, or legal cause, limits defendant liability where the harm caused was not foreseeable. Here it is foreseeable that a motorist would be speeding and have to swerve to avoid loose gravel, and run into another vehicle. Such an accident could lead to injury and death as it did here. Therefore, there is actual and proximate causation.
Damages are clearly shown, because Diane was knocked unconscious and injured and Jack died.
It should be noted that once negligence is proven, a defendant is liable for all injuries of the plaintiff. Defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him. This is where the so called “eggshell skull” plaintiff will recover. In other words, Paul takes Jack as he finds him, bleeding and in need of medical help. Defendant will owe general damages including pain and suffering, and special damages including medical bills and lost income.
(b) A wrongful death action may be brought by a surviving spouse on behalf of her husband. Wrongful death requires a showing of negligence on the part of the defendant that caused the decedents death. Negligence and causation were described above.
Wrongful death carries damages for the value of a person’s life, including present value of future earnings and loss of consortium, as well as pain and suffering before death.
2. Defenses
Defendants may claim contributory negligence as a defense to negligence actions. Contributory negligence is not a complete bar to recovery, because Georgia as adopted a particular comparative negligence statute. Unless the plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant, in which case plaintiff’s negligence will be a complete bar, plaintiff’s claim will be reduced by the percentage of her negligence.
Here, Diane was driving very fast when the accident occurred. We do not know that she was speeding. It is probably that she was speeding by the fact that she was worried Jack was losing blood and by the fact she had activated her emergency lights. We do know, however, that she dangerously accelerated through an intersection when a light was about to turn red. Given that we don’t know she was speeding and we don’t know that she ran a red light, contributory negligence may be very low or hard to prove.
Defendants may also assert last clear chance. P had last clear chance to avoid the accident by slowing for the light. Where P has last clear chance, D will not be held liable for his negligence.
Defendants may also argue that there was no proximate cause because Jack would have died anyway; that his death was not foreseeable. This is not a winner.
3. Rescue Liability
The general rule is that there is no duty to rescue. Under that rule, Paul would have had no rescue liability for calling his boss after the accident rather than providing aid to Jack and Diane. However, where a defendant puts plaintiff in peril, there exists an exception to the no duty to rescue rule. Here, Paul arguably caused the peril by dropping gravel in an intersection which brought about the plaintiffs’ accident. By causing the peril, Paul would be under an affirmation duty to rescue. Gravel Plus will be liable under vicarious liability.
(1)Diane may bring an action against Paul based on negligence in his failure to adequately secure his cargo. To prevail on a negligence claim, Plaintiff must show she was owed a duty, that duty was breached, and the breach was both the actual and proximate cause of her injuries. All drives owe a duty of care to their fellow drivers and pedestrians. Paul, as a professional driver of industrial trucks would be held to an even higher standard of care in the operation of his vehicle, including loading and unloading. The facts indicate Paul was negligent in loading the gravel which caused the gravel to spill in the road. (However, in a case such as this negligence could probably be imputed to Paul through res ipsa loquiter). The negligent loading of the gravel caused it to spill in the road which necessitated Diane’s swerving, as such, it was the actual cause of her accident. Without the gravel in the road, Diane would not have swerved. The negligence in loading the gravel is the proximate cause of the accident as well. There is nothing in the facts to indicate willful or malicious conduct which would give rise to a claim for punitive damages. An accident on the road is a foreseeable consequence of negligence in loading a truck. Diane was injured in the accident, so she should recover damages necessary to make her whole, including pain and suffering as well as damages for lost income. Jack’s estate could also bring a negligence action which would proceed along the same analysis as Diane’s.
Gravel Plus may be liable on the theory of respondeat superior. Respondeat superior will impute negligence to an employer where an employee acts negligently while performing acts within the scope of his employment. Respondeat superior will not apply while the defendant employee is on a “detour”, but will apply when the employee is on a “mere frolic”. The facts indicate nothing to suggest that Paul was not acting within the scope of his employment other than to say that the accident took place on Saturday, which is not a typical work day. He is driving a truck with gravel in it for a gravel company, so absent a showing otherwise, it would seem he is within the scope of his employment which will subject Gravel Plus to liability in regard to claims by Diane and by Jack’s estate. Gravel Plus could also be liable in their own right if they were negligent in hiring Paul. There is nothing in the facts to indicate anything which would put Gravel Plus on notice of Paul’s negligent character (such as multiple speeding tickets, DUI, etc.) So it would seem Gravel Plus will only be likely for imputed negligence.
As Jack’s husband, Diane could bring a wrongful death action for the loss of her husband. She would recover damages for loss of consortium and services, as well as Jack’s projected future salary discounted to present day. Wrongful death actions do not include punitive damages as they are, by nature, somewhat punitive.
Diane could also bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Negligent infliction of emotional distress is recoverable when a party suffers grave emotional damages at the sight of extensive harm to a loved one while in his presence. In Georgia, recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires that the Plaintiff also be injured in the same occurrence. However, Diane’s claim would fail since she was knocked unconscious at the time of the crash and did not witness her husband’s suffering.
(2) The best defense Paul and Gravel Plus would have is that of contributory negligence. Georgia’s comparative negligence statute provides that Plaintiff may recover if she is less at fault than the defendant. In this instance, since Gravel Plus may be liable for imputed negligence, Gravel Plus and Paul will be jointly and severably liable for the damage they have caused. As such, Diane’s negligence will be weighted against the aggregate of the negligence of Gravel Plus and Paul. Unquestionably, under the facts, Diane was somewhat negligent for speeding up to go through a yellow light, yet she may be judged by a more forgiving standard. Since her husband was seriously injured and relying on Diane to seek prompt medical assistance, Diane is judged not by the reasonably prudent person standard but by a standard of a prudent person acting in an emergency.
Paul and Gravel Plus may attempt to raise a defense to Jack that either 1) the accident was not the actual cause of Jack’s death, or 2) they cannot be liable for Jack’s death because he was already wounded at the time of the accident. Neither defense is good under the facts. First, the facts indicate that Jack’s cut was not life threatening. Secondly, the tortfeasors take their victim as they find them. Liability still attached for a more serious injury than would normally occur from a particular type of negligence which would have not caused such a severe injury were it not for a plaintiff’s debilitated condition.
(3) Paul is liable for calling Gravel Plus instead of assisting the victims. Normally there is no duty to render aid or assistance to victims in peril. However, there are a number of exceptions. The applicable exception here is that a party is under an affirmative duty to aid another party where the original party is the party responsible for placing the second party in peril. Here, Paul’s negligence caused Diane to swerve which caused the wreck. He had an affirmative duty to render aid, but did not do so. Gravel Plus will not be liable for Paul’s failure to aid Jack and Diane. After the accident, Paul is probably acting outside the scope of his employment. Even though he called his employer, Paul was not hired by Gravel Plus to assist accident victims or to deal with any other emergency situation.
This is a case of simple tort law. In Georgia, to prove a claim for tort, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the Defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the Defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff’s injuries have been actually caused by the defendant, and (4) such breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff must further prove that they were a foreseeable plaintiff, although that is usually part of 1.
Memorandum
In re Velocity Park
In order to determine the effectiveness of the proposed waiver, as well as any changes, it is important to take into consideration the statutory and other judicial (case law) considerations. Regarding the issue of a minor’s ability to bind himself to the waiver, there is a statute on point. Regarding the requirements for a valid waiver, there are two cases on point in this jurisdiction (Franklin) and one case from Columbia that could provide some guidance.
I. Will a waiver be enforceable if signed only by a minor
II. Will proposed waiver protect velocity?
The Schmidt case laid out the basic requirements for an enforceable waiver. First, the language cannot be over broad, but must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakenly inform the signor of what is being waived. Second, the waiver form must alert the signor to the nature of what is being waived. Also noted in the Land case is the issue of disparity of bargaining power; greater disparity making it more likely to be held unenforceable.
The Land Case goes on to state that a waiver encompassing reckless and intentional conduct will not be upheld.
In view of the applicable law, the proposed waiver would not protect velocity. First, the language of the waiver is overbroad and uses wording that fails to alert the signor of the types of injury that are possible. It is also too complex and filled with “legalese” that would not be appropriate for a layman contract.
Second, the waiver would probably be invalidated because, like the invalid waivers in land and Schmidt it is part of a different document. Additionally, the lettering/font in this waiver is smaller than the rest of the document, which seems to diminish its importance.
Finally, although not dispositive, the circumstances in which the waiver would be signed is indicative of a disparity in bargaining power because they would be handed out where the skate boarders pay their fee and then collected by the cashier, it appears they are given no time to review and question the document.
As written, the waiver would not be valid.
III. What revisions would improve the waiver
If Velocity follows this recommendation, its waiver has a good chance of being enf.
(1) Will the proposed waiver protect Velocity Park?
The proposed waiver likely will not protect Velocity Park as Mr. Oliver intends. For a waiver to be effective, three requirements must be met: (1) the language of the waiver must be clear and not over broad, (2) the waiver taken as a whole “must alert the signor to the nature and significance of what is being signed.” Lund. Courts will also consider the relative bargaining positions of the parties and construe ambiguities against the party seeking to obtain a waiver. Lund. For waivers by minors, the waiver should additionally be “made on behalf of a minor by the minor’s parent or guardian;” otherwise, the minor may disaffirm the contract. 41(b)(1)-(3).
The proposed waiver suffers from several flaws. First, the language of the waiver, including phrases such as “participation in a sport”, “condition in a park,” “any actions of velocity part,” etc are ambiguous. In Lund, the court noted that the phrase “inherent risks in skiing” was too ambiguous to clearly inform the person of rights being waived.
The language is also over broad. Because waivers are construed against the party obtaining it, waivers for intentional acts violate public policy in their entirety. Lund. Quoting R2d 195. Here, the proposed waiver releases “all legal liability” for “any actions of Velocity Park,” (which would include intentional acts), both for the skateboarder and the skateboarder’s heirs and assigns (cf. Holum, where for a parent to release their claims the parent signed a waiver). And, the waiver seeks to void liability not only for Velocity Park, but also for all third parties. These provisions taken alone would probably void the entire waiver.
Also, the language of the waiver should more clearly indicate that it is a waiver. The proposed waiver does not include a header or title drawing the reader’s attention to the fact that it is actually a waiver, in contrast with proper waivers. Lund. The waiver also lacks signature lines on each page, or perhaps even beside each paragraph that significantly waives liability. Accordingly, a party signing the waiver may not appreciate the content of the waiver. Moreover, the waiver uses smaller font than the rest of the document, without capitals or bold to draw attention to particular portions of significance. See Lund.
The waiver also may fail because it is incorporated into a single document along with general information about Velocity Park. It therefore does not clearly call attention to seriousness of the signature. See Holum.
Although the Holum court upheld a waiver that did not use any capitals, Holum was decided in a neighboring jurisdiction and is therefore not binding in Franklin. Holum is also further distinguished as applying to non-profit situations, whereas Mr. Oliver will be charging admission for profit. Rather than run the risk that a Franklin court would rely on these distinguishing characteristics, the proposed waiver should be amended.
Regarding the bargaining power of the parties, Velocity Park appears to have most of the power: Velocity is the only park in the area, a large portion of their business will be from minors, the minor may have to sign the form while standing in line with others waiting (see Lund), and the terms may not be explained to the minor (indeed, Mr. Oliver indicates many would not read it). The proposed waiver should be amended to address the concerns.
The proposed waiver also would only be signed by a minor, and therefore could be disaffirmed in accordance with 41(b)(1)-(2).
(2) Suggested revisions
I have prepared the following list of suggested revisions to bring the waiver into compliance with the public policy considerations set forth in Holum. Notably, the Holum decision involved enforceability by a minor for a harm to her parent, rather than a child’s injuries.
(3) Enforceability against a minor
Waivers signed only by a minor will not be enforceable against the minor because he or she will have the right to disaffirm the contract. 41(b)(1).
Once the minor reaches the age of majority, however, a waiver signed only by a minor may be enforceable where the minor expressly or implicitly ratifies the contract. 41(b)(2). Therefore, although the contract may not be enforceable while a minor, if the minor reaches the age of majority and signs a new waiver (express), or continues to use the skate park (arguably implied ratification), the waiver may be enforceable thereafter.
To: Denna Hall
From: Applicant
Re: Liability Waiver for Velocity Park
Date: Feb 26, 2008
MEMORANDUM
Specific revisions
Design
Layout
Enforceability by minors
This memorandum is in response to whether the proposed waiver brought in by Zeke Oliver will protect Velocity Park from liabilities for injuries occurring at the skate park.
Under Franklin Law waivers, also known as expulpatory clauses, are permitted unless it is contrary to public policy. In Schmit v. Taylor, the Franklin Supreme Court set forth two requirements for an enforceable waiver. First, the language of the waiver cannot be over broad, but clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakenly inform the signor of what is being waived. Thus, a release that is so broad as to be interpreted to shift liability for a tortfeasors conduct under all possible circumstances, including reckless and intentional conduct and for all other possible injuries will not be upheld. The waiver must clear and include language that expressly indicated the guests intent to release the Skate Park from its own negligence. Here, the lack of the word negligence and the ambiguity of terms inherent risk in sports are problematic in the waiver. I would advise that the waiver include the word negligence to release the skate park from negligence. Without this it would seem that the waiver encompasses release from intentional acts which is void and unenforceable under public policy according to restatement of contracts section 95. Further, I would advise that the word sports be replaced with the word skateboarding to prevent the waiver from being overbroad. If the waiver does not include the terms negligence and an explanation of the risks inherent to skateboarding, the claims that arise will only contemplate the risks at the time of signing between the park and the guests. This would leave the park open to huge liability. As such, the terms of the waiver explaining liability from injuries due to equipment failure and conditions in the park are appropriate.
Second, viewed in its entirety, the waiver form itself must alert the nature and the significance of what is being signed. More importantly in our situation, release forms that serve two purposes and those that are conspicuously labeled as waivers have been held to be insufficient to alert the signer that he is waiving liability for other parties negligence as well as his own. Here, the waiver includes three different parts. I would advise that the waiver be a separate document on its own. The Rules and the privacy agreement at the end distract from the significance of what the guest is fully aware of and what they are signing. The waiver should be a separate document to avoid A separate signature should be required as well at the end of the waiver.
Additionally, the substantial disparity in bargaining powers between the parties is considered. This factor alone, however, will not render the waiver void under public policy. This factor looks to the facts surrounding the execution of the waiver. Factors which surround the execution include 1) if the waiver was pointed out to the guest, 2) if its terms were explained to him, 3) a discussion of risks of injuries purported in the form, and 4) whether or not the guest has an opportunity to negotiate regarding the standard waiver in the form. From the interview with Mr. Oliver, it seems that skater inherently understand the risks of the sport. However, it would be advised that as guests are signing the waiver the above factors should be mentioned to each by the staff at the cash register, and discussed further if guests request to do so. Pressure to sign the form might arise as guest will be eager to enter into the park and start their activities so it should also be advised that this should be prevented by the addition of staff or prior reading the waiver on the website.
Lastly, a waiver signed by only a minor is not enforceable unless its for necessaries under the Franklin statute. I would advise that the waiver should be signed by both the parent and the minor in this instance. This would effectuate that the minor is bound to the waiver. In Holum, the courts found that activities that are in the realm of non profit organizations, will support a parents waiver of a childs claim. Although the admission fee would be in question in this matter as the park is planning to charge ten dollars per guest, this sum might seem a small fee by some courts. Moreover, the client intends on not charging in the future which would also bolster his non profit purpose to provide outdoor activities to children.
Issue: Can the FRSA be grounds to quash the subpoena issued against Lisa Peel?
Yes
The subpoena directing Lisa Peel should be quashed on the grounds that it violates the Franklin Reporter Shield Act (FRSA). The FRSA prohibits courts from compelling reporters to disclose the source of “any information or unpublished material…” FRSA 902. The purpose of the Act is to “safeguard the media’s ability to gather news and promote the free flow of information to the public by prohibiting courts from compelling reporters to disclose unpublished news sources or information received from such sources.” §900.
First, the district attorney (DA) will argue that Ms. Peel is not a reporter for the purposes of the Act. In order to fall under the protection of the Act, one must be a “reporter” who is regularly engaged in the collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news medium.” FRSA §901. The Franklin Court of Appeal has already decided a case closely on point to Ms. Peel’s case, finding that a newspaper photographer was, for the purposes of the statute, a reporter protected under the shield law. To prove that one is a “reporter” for the purposes of the FRSA, one must show that she had “an intent at the inception of the newsgathering process to disseminate investigative news to the public.” In re Bellows (Franklin Ct, Appeal 2005). Ms. Peel engaged in each of the enumerated activities referenced in the FRSA: she collected information and investigated for her article, wrote it, and edited her article for her blog. She is “regularly engaged” in these activities, since she updates her blog once a week on Fridays with information from meetings, makes calls to officials for interviews, and analyzes such information on her blog.
This case can be distinguished from Hovery v. Fellenz, where the reporters happened upon a crime on their way home from work without intent to disseminate the news to the public. Ms. Peel sought out and investigated sources and information for her articles, with the primary purpose of discovering information to publish on her blog. No where in the Act does it require that renumeration be shown to prove that she was a professional reporter. Nevertheless, Ms. Peel receives income from the ads which have sponsor her blog. Moreover, the statute enumerates “community antenna television services,” which are traditionally not for profit.
Second, the DA will argue that Ms. Peel did not publish her work through a “news medium” as required under the Act. The statute defines “news medium” as “any newspaper, magazine or other similar medium issued at regular intervals and having general circulation.” Ms. Peel’s blog fits into this definition. The Court will likely use the statutory construction principles outlined in Lane, which stated that where the language of an Act is ambiguous, courts can look to external aid to interpret the statute. Lane v. Tichenor (2003). In this case, the American Heritage Dictionary defines “circulation” as “the condition of being passed about and widely known,” and “publish” as “to bring to public attention, to announce.” Ms. Peel’s blog falls into both of these definitions, since her blog is well known in the community for announcements to the extent that is has come to the attention of the DA. Ms. Peel’s blog is regularly circulated. Although only 9% of the community has registered with the blog, the site has been visited 15,000 times. The Court in Bellows found that the newspaper at issue with a daily circulation with more than 100,000 readers constituted a news medium. Given the amount of people who look at her site regularly, her blog should be considered news media. As asserted in America Today, blogs are steadily replacing newspapers as public sources of information, and therefore should fall under the definition of the statute.
The Court in Lane v. Tichenor stated that where “general words follow particular and specific words in a statute, the general words must be construed to include only things of the same general kind as those indicated by the particular and specific words.” Just as the statute in Lane included a list which was neither exhaustive nor exclusive, the FRSA uses terms such as “other” and “similar” to indicate that their list should not be read to be exhausted. The Court then found that the words “recreational purpose” followed by “other similar activities” referred to activities that shared in common the outdoors, nature, and natural settings. Therefore, it ruled that hayrides fell into this category even though it was not enumerated specifically in statute.
In this case, Ms. Peel’s blog falls under the tem “other similar medium.” The statute generally refers to news medium, followed by a list of specific kinds of news media. Although blogs are not explicitly listed, the list of news media examples are not limited to print media, but include radio and television. Viewed in all, the list indicated a category where dissemination of information to the public is the purpose of the medium. Moreover, the list includes medium such as television, whose sole purpose is not limited to newsworthy information television is often the medium for advertisements and entertainment. Hence, if the district attorney attempts to argue that Ms. Peel’s blog is not newsworthy all the time since she includes personal information on her blog, Ms. Peel can argue that not all of the enumerated news media examples are solely for the purpose of newsworthy items.
Finally, the very purpose of the FRSA is to protect reporters from being forced to reveal their sources to encourage the free flow of information to the public. Ms. Peel pointed out that she is essentially the only source of information that revealed the story that she published and presents the only alternate point of view from the single daily paper in the community. Revealing her confidential sources would defer sources from coming forward in the future, and defeat the purpose of the Act.
MEMORANDUM
TO: Henry Black
FROM: Applicant
RE: Peel Subpoena
DATE: February 26, 2008
After reviewing the relevant authority, it is my opinion that the Franklin Reporter Shield Act (FRSA) will apply to Ms. Peel and her blog. My conclusion is based on current case law as well as the rules of statutory construction. I base my findings on the In Re Bellows and Lane v. Tichenor. The key issues to focus on when determining whether the statute is applicable are the intended meanings of the term “reporter” and “news medium” in the FRSA.
Definition of Reporter
In Bellows the court discussed the test utilized when determining whether one would be deemed a reporter. The court indicated that the focus should be on the “intent at the inception of the newsgathering process to disseminate investigative news to the public.” Ms. Peel clearly has satisfied this burden. While her blog does contain extraneous portions (i.e. gardening tips and personal photos), there is an intention on her part to accurately investigate, uncover, and publish newsworthy information on her blog. Although this was not the initial purpose of the blog, it does appear to be one of the primary goals now. Therefore, I believe she should be classified as a reporter.
We must also look at the face of the statute itself when trying to ascertain the proper definition of a reporter. The FRSA defines a reporter as “any person regularly engaged in collecting, writing, or editing news for publication through a news medium.” The main rule of statutory construction requires us to look at the face of the statute first to garner the intended meaning of terms. If the meaning is ambiguous on the face of the statute, then it is acceptable to give words their plain, ordinary meaning (p. 12). In Bellows ‘collecting’ was given its dictionary definition to help the court decide whether a photographer came under the heading of a reporter. In our present case, this interpretation is extremely useful. Collecting, according to the Bellows court, meant to bring together, gather, and assemble. That is precisely what Ms. Peel does. She herself has said she attends public meetings, reads documents, and performs investigations in a similar manner as a traditional reporter, She gathers the information with the previously discussed intent to disseminate it.
When we apply the everyday meaning to a term of a statute, we must ensure that the legislature’s intent remains intact. And in our case, it does. The intent is clear on the face of the statute. The FRSA is designed to promote the free flow of information to the public and by allowing Ms. Peel to protect her sources, there is a greater chance others will come forward with information pertaining to matters of public concern.
Definition of News Medium
Ms. Peel’s blog constitutes a news medium for purposes of the FRSA. Again, we are allowed to utilize additional sources because the language of the statute is ambiguous. In Lane, the court utilized a canon of statutory interpretation known as ejusdem generis to help clarify the reaches of a statute. The canon states that when general words follow particular specific words in a statute, the general words must be construed to include only things of the same general kind as those indicated by the particular and specific words (p. 15). This canon can be applied to the FRSA’s section defining a news medium. The FRSA begins by stating specific mediums such as newspapers and magazines, then proceeds to use the general description of other similar medium issued at regular intervals. It is my opinion that Ms. Peel’s blog has the same vital characteristics as a newspaper or magazine. Both mediums involve investigation of matters of public interest. The facts discovered are then compiled, edited, and published at regular intervals for the general public. These are the defining characteristics of all 3 and as such, serves as evidence that the blog should be considered a news medium.
Possible Adverse Arguments
There are a few points that should be noted, which may be raised by opposing counsel. First, in the case of St. Mary’s Hospital v Zeus Publishing, the court held that a full page ad revealing illegal activity was not news. Similarly, the Columbia Supreme Court has rejected the argument that defamatory messages posted on a Sports Internet Bulletin constitute news. These two cases are important to note because when one thinks of a blog, one often thinks of a series of internet postings versus something akin to the New York Times. Therefore, opposing counsel may try to argue that Ms. Peel’s blog is more like the online bulletin or full page ad than a traditional news source. These two examples can be distinguished from the case at hand. The full page ad was not the result of consistent investigatory work that continually produces newsworthy information and articles for the general public. It was not a medium but rather a one time announcement. The Sports bulletin case dealt with defamatory statements being posted with no particular time intervals specified. There is no evidence that the contents of the online bulletin was the result of work akin to that of an investigative reporter, whose main intent is to disseminate truthful information to the public for their benefit.
One important factor to note is that neither the full page ad nor the Sports bulletin seemed to have set intervals for publication. Opposing counsel may try to argue that this is also the case for Ms. Peel’s blog since it is not updated at the same time each week. However, the time frame for the blog’s entries (every 7-9 days) is fairly consistent and would probably be able to withstand such an argument.
For the above mentioned reasons, it is my opinion that Ms. Peel should be able to claim the protection of FRSA.
To: Henry Black
From: Applicant
Re: Peel Subpoena
Date: February 26, 2008
Issue
Whether the FRSA may be used to quash a subpoena for a blogger’s sources?
Argument and Citation to Authority
I. Burden of Proof
It is the burden of the party claiming the privilege to establish his or her right to its protection. Wehrmann v. Wickesberg. In order for Ms. Peel to claim privilege under the FRSA, it is her burden to show she qualifies for the privilege.
II. The Statute
The FRSA prohibits courts from compelling reporters to disclose unpublished news sources or information received from such sources. The statute defines a “reporter” as any person regularly engaged in collecting, writing, or editing news for publication through a news medium. The statute considers any medium issued at regular intervals and having a general circulation, like a newspaper, to be a “news medium”. The plain language of the statute does not address blogging or internet news outlets, therefore, in order to succeed. Ms. Peel must argue that the terms “reporter” and “medium” are so ambiguous that the facts of this case would allow the court to interpret Ms. Peel’s status as a blogger is akin to a report, and her blog is a news medium.
A. Ambiguous Language
Ms. Peel’s case is unique as similar facts have not been litigated in this jurisdiction before. There is no case directly on point, there are several cases which aid Ms. Peel’s argument. Lane v. Tichenor sheds some light on statutory interpretation in this jurisdiction. In Lane, the court held where the language of the statute is unclear, the court may avail itself of external aids to interpret the statute. The Lane court relied on the canons of statutory interpretation. Specifically, the court relied on ejusdem generis, which provides that when general words follow particular and specific words in a statute, the general words must be construed to include only things of the same general kind as those indicated by the particular and specific words. Using this canon, the Lane court determined that hayrides were within the FLRIA because the statutory language indicated that activities promoting the enjoyment of nature were protected. Adopting the logic of that case, to this issue, the terms following “news medium” are newspaper and magazine; the terms following circulation are radio station and television station. Ms. Peel should argue that terms newspaper and magazine indicate a publishing of news. Additionally, radio stations and television stations are both mediums for broadcasting news. Ms. Peel should argue that her blog both publishes and broadcasts the news as the blog is published to her web page, which is then broadcast over the internet.
Ms. Peel also has a strong argument that her actions fit the role of a reporter. “Reporter status” requires an intent at the inception of the newsgathering process to disseminate investigative news to the public. In re Bellows. The facts indicate that Ms. Peel meets that reporter status requirement. She attends all local meeting and records the minutes for the sole purpose of making them available as news to the townsfolk. Further, the story she published about the superintendent was written to disseminate investigative news to the public about the corruption engaged in by the school board. The court in Bellows also recognized that courts may use a dictionary to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of a word not defined by the statute. The dictionary defines circulation as “dissemination of printed material, especially copies of newspapers or magazines among readers; the number of copies of a publication sold or distributed.” Under the plain meaning, Ms. Peel’s actions may meet that definition. The blog is published electronically once a week. Further 3,500 townspeople are registered on the blogsite and the site has been visited more than 15,000 times. “Publication” means the communication of information to the public. Ms. Peel may argue her blog communicates valuable community information to the public.
B. Contents of the Blog
Ms. Peel does publish personal information to the blog like family information, but the majority of her blogs contain facts with opinion interjected. She posts her blogs once a week. The blogs usually contain information such as town council agendas, school board information, posted minutes from county meetings, movie reviews and gardening tips. Ms. Peel should argue her blogs contain the same information most town newspapers publish. She may argue her blog performs the role of the newspaper in her small town.
C. D.A.’s Response
The D.A. will likely respond that Ms. Peel is not covered under the FRSA. He will argue the language of the statute does not include bloggers or blogs and Ms. Peel is therefore precluded from asserting the privilege. He may rely on a Columbia case, Hausch v. Vaughan, however that case is persuasive authority and may be distinguished from Ms. Peel’s case. The court in Hausch, declined to extend the privilege to derogatory messages posted on an internet bulletin board. The court found the message were unprotected because they were not news and were not published at regular intervals. Ms. Peel’s facts are quite different, as she publishes her blog weekly and her blogs do contain news regarding public government meetings.
The D.A. may also argue that blogs are advertisements for local businesses, which pay Ms. Peel to publish her blog as an advertisement. In St. Mary’s Hospital v. Zeus Publishing, the court rejected the use of the FRSA to protect the identities of those paying newspaper ads disguised as journalism. Ms. Peel may distinguish her facts from St. Mary’s, as her advertisements are small and the advertisers do not pay her much money.
Conclusion
Ms. Peel should succeed in asserting a privilege to revealing her source under FRSA. The court will likely find she was acting as a reporter, her blog is a news medium, and thus she may not be compelled to reveal her source.